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Abstract 
 
With the Eastern Enlargement successfully completed, the EU is searching for a proper 
balance between internal security and external stabilisation that is  acceptable to all 
sides. This paper focuses on an EU foreign policy instrument that is a case in point for 
this struggle: EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. By looking at the EU’s 
strategy on visa facilitation and readmission, this paper aims to offer a first systematic 
analysis of the objectives, substance and political implications of these agreements as 
a means to implement a new EU security approach in the neighbourhood. In offering 
more relaxed travel conditions in exchange for the signing of an EC readmission 
agreement and reforming domestic justice and home affairs, the EU has found a new 
way to press for reforms in neighbouring countries while addressing a major source of 
discontent in these countries. The analysis concludes with the broader implications of 
these agreements and argues that even if the facilitated travel opportunities are 
beneficial for the citizens of the target countries, the positive achievements are 
undermined by the Schengen enlargement, which makes the new member states tie up 
their borders to those of their neighbours. 
 
 
 
 
 7
CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 363 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the EU has assumed a greater role in dealing with security concerns 
within the EU. In response to nation states’ decreasing capabilities to deal effectively 
with problems at the national level, domestic policy fields such as asylum and migration 
have been at least partially transferred to supranational responsibility (Scharpf, 2003; 
Zürn, 2000). One of the issues that receives increasing attention at the supranational 
level is irregular migration. Every year, an estimated 30 million people cross an 
international border irregularly, of which, according to Europol, between 400,000 and 
500,000 enter the EU. The stock of irregular residents in the EU is currently estimated 
to be around three million (Council of Europe, 2003). In recent years, EU members 
have come to the conclusion that they are no longer able to properly react to the 
phenomenon of irregular migration on the domestic level and instead need to combine 
their efforts regarding return policies on the European level. Measures against irregular 
immigration thus became a focal point in the EU’s efforts to establish an ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice’.  
At the same time, the EU’s role in the outside world has changed. With the Eastern 
enlargement, new regions and countries became neighbours of the EU. New 
frameworks of cooperation, such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 
and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) were set in motion to closely affiliate 
neighbouring states with the EU (Emerson, 2005; Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005; 
Emerson et al., 2007; Landaburu, 2006; Tassinari, 2006). The EU tried to assume a 
greater responsibility in the stabilisation of the neighbourhood and sought to “promote a 
ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders 
of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” 
(European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 8). A major challenge in the EU’s efforts to 
stabilise the neighbourhood was to find a proper balance with the internal security 
concerns. Whereas the EU’s foreign and security policy was interested in advancing 
regional integration and good neighbourly relations, the EU justice and home affairs 
ministers were primarily guided by their interest in keeping problems out and the 
external border closed.  
This paper is concerned with an EU foreign policy instrument that is a case in point for 
this struggle: EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. These agreements aim 
at fostering good neighbourly relations by easing the tight visa regime with 
neighbouring countries in order to externalise a restrictive migration policy. By 
elaborating on the EU’s strategy on visa facilitation and readmission, this paper aims at 
offering a first systematic analysis of the objective, substance, and political implications 
of these agreements. When was the link between visa facilitation and readmission 
made? What are the target countries, and what do these agreements imply for these 
countries?  
In the following, we start with an elaboration of the problems inherent in the EU’s efforts 
to establish a strong external border control while seeking to stabilise the 
neighbourhood. The argument this paper advances is that the shifting of the EU’s 
border policies to the Central and Eastern European countries has created a need for a 
new EU security approach in the neighbourhood. This approach is defined as the 
explicit attempt of the EU to balance internal security concerns and external 
stabilisation needs. In offering more relaxed travel conditions in exchange for the 
signing of an EC readmission agreement and reforming domestic justice and home 
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affairs, the EU found a new way to press for reforms in neighbouring countries, while 
meeting a major source of discontent in these countries. Part 3 introduces the 
instrument of an EC readmission agreement, looks back over when the connection to 
visa facilitation was made and presents the importance of EC visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements in the relations with the Western Balkan countries on the one 
hand, and the European Neighbourhood Policy on the other. Since the Western Balkan 
countries have the prospect of joining the EU one day, they are not subsumed under 
the European Neighbourhood Policy but under a specific regional pre-accession 
strategy. Part 4 analyses the differences and similarities between the various visa and 
readmission agreements. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements were so far 
concluded with the Western Balkan countries, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian 
Federation and may become a standard foreign policy instrument in the context of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. The analysis concludes with the broader implications 
of these agreements and argues that even if facilitated travel opportunities are 
beneficial for the citizens of the target countries, the positive achievements are 
undermined by the Schengen enlargement, which makes the new member states tie up 
their borders to those of their neighbours.  
 
2. Controlling EU frontiers while stabilising the 
neighbourhood: conflicting objectives? 
 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has worked on the establishment of a common 
“area of freedom, security and justice”. Political actors have developed a common 
understanding of security threats based on the idea that a safe inside should be most 
effectively protected from an unsafe outside (Monar, 2001a). Accordingly, a strong and 
effective control of external frontiers became a crucial objective of EU cooperation in 
justice and home affairs. At the same time, with the Central and Eastern European 
countries becoming new EU member states, the stabilisation of the neighbourhood 
gained in importance. With a particular focus on the role of visa and readmission 
policies, the following section discusses the problems arising from the EU’s efforts to 
establish a strong and effective external border control while seeking to stabilise the 
neighbourhood.  
2.1 The birth of the European area of freedom, security and justice 
The Treaty of Amsterdam first introduced the idea of establishing a “European area of 
freedom, security and justice”: barriers to the free movement of people across borders 
should be minimised, the EU’s internal security enhanced, and the human rights of all 
EU citizens respected. On the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU’s cooperation in 
justice and home affairs took on an entirely new quality and developed a substantial 
growth dynamic. The domain turned into a major field of EU policy making. EU action in 
justice and home affairs was no longer seen as complementary to the functioning of the 
single European market, but rather as a means to realise the ambitious project of an 
area of freedom, security and justice. The EU was to create an “internal security 
regime” (Anderson & Apap, 2002, p. 4) consisting of three main pillars:  
1) the creation of a common territory without internal borders along with the setting-up 
of a common external border policy;  
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2) the strengthening of international police cooperation, particularly in (internal) cross-
border regions (regulations of cross-border pursuit, joint police stations, joint 
patrolling in cross-border areas, etc.);  
3) and finally, the pooling of police data and information among national law 
enforcement bodies (Schengen Information System – SIS; Costumes Information 
Service – CIS, Europol’s computerised system of collected information, Eurodac) 
(Anderson & Apap, 2002, p. 4; Apap et al., 2004, p. 9).  
But what were the dynamics underlying the creation of an area of freedom, security 
and justice?  
In his widely cited article ‘The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, 
Driving Factors and Costs’, Jörg Monar (2001a) explained the rapid development and 
expansion of co-operation in justice and home affairs on the basis of two sets of 
factors; firstly: “‘laboratories’ which have helped to pave the way for the extraordinary 
development during the last decade and [secondly] ‘driving factors’ which have been 
triggering developments and further expansion of EU action” (Monar, 2001a, p. 748). 
The Council of Europe, Trevi and Schengen were identified as the major laboratories.1 
Transnational challenges, spillover-effects from economic integration, the interest of 
certain member states to ‘Europeanise’ their national problems and the dynamic 
created by the launching of the project of an ‘area of freedom, security’ were listed as 
the major driving forces.  
Other scholars argued that the dynamic growth cannot be understood without focusing 
on the changing conceptions of security and its implications for EU cooperation in 
justice and home affairs (Anderson & Apap, 2002; Bigo & Guild, 2005a; Huysmans, 
2000). Since the 1980s co-operation in various security issues has led to close 
interaction between national interior ministers and their officials. These political actors 
promoted their action in very different policy areas, such as terrorism, organised crime, 
trans-border crime, irregular immigration, asylum seekers and minority ethnic groups, 
as different elements to deal with one general security threat. As a matter of fact, 
different groups of people and problems were categorised “too quickly and too 
emphatically” (Anderson & Apap, 2002, p. 1) as security threats. This categorisation of 
various phenomena as security threats concerned first and foremost migrants and 
asylum seekers. Migration was increasingly described as a danger to domestic 
security, representing a threat. In this way, migration has been converted into a law-
and-order question and became “securitized” (Huysmans, 2000; Vink, 2002).  
However, not all migrants were categorised as a threat: migrants from within Europe, 
more specifically from within the EU, were excluded from the political discourse. While 
the free movement of persons within the EU was actually fostered, the discursive logic 
drew a clear distinction between EU-nationals and non-EU-nationals. The EU-space 
was presented as the “safe(r) inside” and contrasted with the “unsafe(r) outside” 
(Monar, 2001a, p. 762). The EU’s frontiers were increasingly established as the 
dividing line between inside and outside, and “law enforcement and border controls 
[became] key instruments to maintain and further enhance the distinction” (Ibid). The 
control of the external frontiers became the one major objective of EU cooperation in 
                                                     
1 Between 1975 until 1993, Trevi (Abbreviation for the French words ‘Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme 
et Violence Internationale’) provided EC member states with a framework to fight terrorism. Trevi was only 
a loose form of intergovernmental cooperation, as it had no permanent institution and lacked legal 
instruments. Its mandate, however, was gradually expanded and eventually covered also other areas such 
as the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime.  
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justice and home affairs. These discursive narratives of the relation between frontier 
and controls are now widely accepted in the EU but have also met strong criticism in 
that they artificially construct “frontiers” and create the myth that the effective control of 
these frontiers would be the solution of “immigration control” (Bigo, 2005).  
2.2 Extending the EU’s border control policies to the East: implications 
for inside and outside countries  
In the Amsterdam Treaty the EU15 took a major decision with regard to justice and 
home affairs and the EU’s external relations. Due to security concerns in the Central 
and Eastern European countries, the EU15 decided to include the Schengen 
regulations and rules – “an uncatalogued miscellany of decisions and agreed working 
practices, a sort of disjointed incrementalism par excellence” (Lavenex & Wallace, 
2005, p. 465) – into the EU’s acquis communautaire to be incorporated in the legal 
order of the countries seeking accession. Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol annexed 
to the Amsterdam Treaty states that the “[S]chengen acquis and further measures 
taken by the institutions within its scope […] must be accepted in full by all States 
candidates for admission.” Opt-outs like those of the UK and Ireland were no longer 
permissible for new member states. This decision was based on the dual motivation  
to bring the applicant border policies progressively in line with the 
Schengen acquis and also to address immediate EU concerns about 
threats perceived by its member states. The most evident and pervasive of 
these concerns is the potential for illegal immigration by east Europeans or 
third-country nationals travelling through the applicant countries (Grabbe, 
2000, p. 9). 
The definition of the Schengen regulations as part of the acquis meant for the 
candidate states in Central and Eastern Europe that a sizeable and complex body of 
laws and practice must be implemented upon accession. The candidate states found 
themselves under strong pressure to upgrade their external border control regimes to 
the high legal, organisational and technical standards outlined in the Schengen acquis. 
The adaptation process involved substantial financial and administrative efforts (House 
of Lords, 2000; Monar, 2001b).  
What is more, the new drawing of the EU’s external border had a profound impact on 
the relations between the enlarged EU and the non-EU parts of Europe. Fears were 
voiced that the transfer of rigid border control policies would reinforce barriers between 
countries that traditionally had close relations, such as Poland and Ukraine. A particular 
concern was the transfer of the EU’s visa regime to the accession countries. The 
candidate countries needed to adopt the EU’s visa regime in full and were therefore 
required to impose visas on citizens of neighbouring countries in case those states 
were listed on the EU’s negative visa list. This conditionality requirement was 
particularly difficult as many applicant states had minorities on the other side of the 
border (for instance, the Hungarian minority in Serbia). Moreover, after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the governments of the Central European states had pursued an open 
borders policy as an important element to maintain good relationships with 
neighbouring countries. Sustained by Western European states as part of regional and 
bilateral integration, these countries have built up intense relations across borders and 
allowed citizens of countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Belarus to travel easily to 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
The open-borders policy has affected thousands of ordinary citizens on 
both sides of the border, and has significantly contributed to efforts to 
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overcome the historical legacy of mutual prejudice, stereotypes and 
resentments. […] Open borders have also fostered contacts of national 
minorities, such as the Belarusians in Poland or the Hungarians in Ukraine 
(Trans-Carpatia), Yugoslavia (Vojvodina) and Romania, with their mother 
countries (Apap et al., 2001, pp. 2-3).  
The EU enlargement process led to the end of the liberalised movement of persons in 
the region. The accession process made the Central and Eastern European countries 
demand new visa requirements for third countries being located on the EU’s negative 
visa list, including all Western Balkan states (with the exception of Croatia), Russia, 
Ukraine and other CIS countries. This step seriously confined the possibilities of free 
movement for citizens of these states. The imposition of visa requirements was 
therefore likely to disrupt the socioeconomic and political relationships across border 
regions (see, inter alia, Grabbe, 2002, p. 91f; Monar, 2001b, p. 9f; Apap et al., 2001). 
Scholars observed an inherent tension between the EU’s internal and external security 
policies in Central and Eastern Europe:  
The EU’s external security concerns have caused it to encourage regional 
integration at all levels in eastern Europe, but at the same time its emerging 
internal security policies (contained in the newly integrated Schengen 
Convention, and justice and home affairs cooperation) are having contrary 
effects by reinforcing barriers between countries (Grabbe, 2000, p. 1).  
In this view, the EU was not paying enough attention to the geo-political implications of 
enlargement.  
The EU tried to minimise the negative side-effects of enlargement. In the European 
Security Strategy, the neighbouring countries moved to the centre of attention.  
It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in 
Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political 
cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems 
there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the 
problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a 
neighbouring region (European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 9).  
In March 2003, a new framework of relations was proposed with the countries 
neighbouring the enlarged Union to the East and South. The objective was to “develop 
a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the 
EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003a, p. 4). On the one hand, the initiative was intended to associate 
the neighbouring states as closely as possible, on the other hand it made clear that full 
membership is not an option. The former President of the European Commission 
Romano Prodi phrased this principle as “sharing everything but institutions” (Prodi, 
2002). The initiative is therefore the attempt to stabilise the European neighbourhood 
without the most successful foreign policy tool, i.e. the membership incentive (as a 
result, the Western Balkans and Turkey were excluded from the European 
Neighbourhood Policy as they still have the membership perspective). This time, the 
major incentive for cooperation should be the vision of an open and integrated market: 
Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean 
should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and 
further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – 
persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms) (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003a, p. 4).  
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In brief, the European Neighbourhood Policy presents a major political project of the 
EU “with the aim to manage its new interdependence in an altered geopolitical context” 
(Lavenex, 2004, p. 680). This new interdependence concerns in particular “soft 
security” issues to be dealt with in justice and home affairs cooperation (for more 
details, see Wichmann, 2007). In this respect, the policies on visa and readmission 
were considered as particularly important elements – although for different reasons.  
2.3 The relevance of visa and readmission policies in the neighbourhood 
The EU considers its visa policies a chief means to select ‘worthy’ from ‘unworthy’ 
guests. Issuing visas occupies an important place in the EU’s understanding of 
effective and comprehensive border management. For the EU, the first line of border 
control starts directly in third-countries, whereas the second line is the border itself. 
Visas therefore play an important role in what scholars called “policing at a distance” 
(Bigo & Guild, 2005b, p. 1). The Amsterdam Treaty transferred far-reaching 
competences in the visa domain to the European Community, which were then used to 
differentiate the world in four categories of citizens:2 firstly, European Union citizens 
who have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the European Union 
(limitations to this right are allowed only in a few cases); secondly, citizens of countries 
participating in the European Economic Area enjoying privileged relationships with the 
EU and having equivalent rights; thirdly, favoured third-countries, e.g. Israel, which are 
placed on the EU’s ‘positive’ visa list of Council Regulation 539/2001 meaning that their 
nationals do not require a visa to enter the EU; and finally, third-countries that are 
placed on the ‘negative’ visa list of Council Regulation 539/2001 meaning that their 
citizens do require a visa to enter the EU (Bigo & Guild, 2005c, pp. 235-236; Council of 
the European Union, 2001a).  
Citizens of countries placed on the negative visa list are considered by definition as 
potential security risks. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild point to the fact that the negative 
visa list, “if one applies the logic to its extreme, [is] a generalized form of the so-called 
‘rogue states’. It denotes suspicion, mistrust and fear about the nationals of that state” 
(Bigo & Guild, 2005c, p. 236). In Council Decision 539/2001, the EU has placed all 
countries subsumed under the current enlargement process and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy onto the list of countries whose citizens require a visa for the 
EU. The two exceptions were Israel and Croatia.  
This decision was bound to have major implications. In the neighbouring countries 
being placed on the negative visa list, the picture was reinforced that the EU is 
establishing a ‘fortress Europe’. The visa policies have negatively affected the image of 
the European Union in the neighbourhood. Obtaining a Schengen Visa is a relatively 
complicated and costly procedure for third-country citizens. Studies revealed that the 
current EU visa practices are perceived as intransparent, too expensive and 
troublesome in neighbouring countries (ICG, 2005; Boratynski et al., 2006a). Even the 
                                                     
2 First aspects of the visa policies were already brought within the Community framework with the 
Maastricht Treaty, concretely, the determination of the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the member states, and the establishment of a 
standard model visa. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) then broke ground for an expansion of the EU’s visa 
policy. It was pooled in the newly introduced Title IV ‘Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies related 
to free movements of persons’ and brought under the legal framework of the Community. In addition, the 
Schengen acquis was annexed to the treaty, so that harmonisation measures regarding visas upon which 
the Schengen members have agreed outside the Community now became part of the Union’s legal 
framework.  
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European Commission noticed that “our existing visa policies and practices often 
impose real difficulties and obstacles to legitimate travel. Long queues in front of EU 
consulates are a highly visible sign of the barriers to entry into the Union” (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 5). Due to its geographical location, the 
negative implications of the visa regime were particularly visible in the Western 
Balkans. In this regional setting, the EU’s visa regime has even caused an increasing 
European alienation effect. The International Crisis Groups assessed that the current 
visa regime was seen as “fostering resentment, inhibiting progress on trade, business, 
education and more open civil societies, and as a result contributing negatively to 
regional stability” (ICG, 2005, p. i). 
In interviews for this analysis, European Commission officials also named a second 
reason why the current EU visa practices were increasingly put into question: they 
simply do not achieve the desired results. In the EU a consensus is emerging that 
irregular immigration and organised crime cannot be prevented through strict visa 
regulations. See, for instance, the statement of a European Commission official who 
critically assessed the current visa practices:  
There is a big misunderstanding in the EU. Visa policy has nothing to do 
with illegal migration or trafficking in human beings. It is like the link 
between prohibition and drinking beer. Once you forbid alcohol at all levels, 
all beer drinkers become criminals. If you are limiting or suppressing the 
possibilities for something that is basic, like beer drinking or going to Paris 
for a weekend, then people invent things to be nonetheless able to do it. 
And they will find a way. So the EU’s visa policy is not helping a bit to 
reduce the number of criminals or economic illegal immigrants, because 
they are already there.3  
For the EU, another instrument gained in importance that was considered more 
effective in terms of reducing irregular immigration: the signing of readmission 
agreements. An effective return policy to enforce control measures moved to the centre 
of member states’ attention when the Schengen agreements shifted the focus from 
nation state borders to external borders. The European Commission, as well as 
governments of member states, argued on various occasions that the credibility and 
integrity of the legal EU immigration system would be in danger without an efficient 
common return policy (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b, p. 8). 
Consequently, readmission agreements – a long-standing instrument of nation states 
to facilitate the return of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers – have 
increasingly been discussed as a Community instrument on the supranational level. 
After the Amsterdam Treaty had transferred the competence to negotiate and conclude 
readmission agreements with third countries to the European Union, the European 
Council had to adopt criteria for identifying third countries with which multilateral 
readmission agreements should be negotiated (Council of the European Union, 
2002a). The following criteria were agreed: 
• Nature and size of migratory flows toward the EU (migration pressure, number of 
persons awaiting return); 
• Geographical position vis-à-vis the EU and regional balance; 
• Need for capacity-building concerning migration management; 
                                                     
3 Authors’ interview with EU official, 4 May 2006.  
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• Existing framework for cooperation; 
• Attitude towards cooperation on migration issues (Council of the European Union, 
2002a, Council of the European Union, 2002c). 
The EU’s activism with regard to signing EC readmission agreements with 
neighbouring countries showed that the EU increasingly became aware of the 
insufficiency of domestic border controls if those are not backed up by cooperation with 
countries of origin and transit; this underscored the external dimension of JHA policies. 
We can generally distinguish two approaches to dealing with the external dimension of 
EU migration policy: the first approach seeks to externalise traditional tools of domestic 
or EU migration control to sending and transit countries, e.g. border control. The 
second approach is preventive in nature and strives towards eliminating the root 
causes of migration (Boswell, 2003). These two approaches differ fundamentally in 
their perception of how to deal with substantial numbers of immigrants and most likely 
affect the EU’s relations with neighbouring countries in different ways. The first is a 
restrictive and control-oriented approach in which the EU passes classic migration 
control instruments on to non-member countries that have to accept provisions for 
facilitating the return of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers. The second 
approach seeks to abolish circumstances in the countries of origin that force people to 
migrate to the EU and builds on mutually beneficial forms of cooperation between the 
EU and third countries. 
The European Union has repeatedly emphasised that it seeks to take both approaches 
into account. However, the more restrictive first approach – for which readmission 
agreements are a case in point – has dominated the debate at least since the 
beginning of the millennium. The framing of readmission policy has been of high 
significance for the EU’s attitude towards countries of origin and transit. The top priority 
position that was increasingly given to the negotiations on EC readmission agreements 
with third countries illustrated the focus on restrictive policies of demarcation. When the 
EU realised the limited success in signing readmission agreements and accepted the 
link between readmission and visa facilitation, the restrictive approach was softened at 
least with regard to the neighbouring regions.  
 
3. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements: 
developing a new security approach 
 
This section introduces the eventual coupling of the negotiations on EC readmission 
agreements to the incentive of visa facilitation. The instrument of EC visa facilitation 
and readmission agreements was considered to be beneficial to both sides: they 
provide the EU with a strong lever to make third countries sign readmission 
agreements and increase the reform efforts in their domestic justice and home affairs 
sector, while they also meet major grievances of the neighbouring countries by easing 
the tight visa regime and fostering facilitated travel opportunities for bona fide 
travellers. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements gradually moved to the 
centre of a new EU security approach in the neighbourhood.  
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3.1 The instrument of EC readmission agreements with neighbouring 
states  
3.1.1 What are EC readmission agreements?  
The EU’s efforts to reach a high number of readmission agreements with all states 
around its territory, and even with more distant transit and origin countries, represents 
the attempt to create concentric circles of demarcation (Council of the European Union, 
1998, Article 60). The concept of concentric circles of demarcation stands for extending 
the redistributive system for the examination of asylum claims to non-EU countries and 
expulsing irregular immigration to outside territories. Such a policy is intended to 
transfer responsibility to non-member countries. Whereas the original model included 
four circles (Council of the European Union, 1998, point 61), in the context of EC 
readmission agreements, the model of concentric circles was slightly modified to three 
circles of enforcement: the pre-embarkation checks are geographically the outermost 
circle and the Schengen border is the innermost. The network of readmission 
agreements then constitutes the middle circle. 
After the Amsterdam Treaty transferred competences for readmission to the EU, 
member states decided to sign only those Community readmission agreements that 
provide for the return of not only citizens of contracting states but also third country 
nationals. Such an obligation to readmit third country nationals cannot be deduced from 
international law.4 However, some advocates of readmission of foreign nationals refer 
to “the principle of neighbourliness and the responsibility of a state for those 
impairments to other states emanating from its territory” (Hailbronner, 1997, p. 31). 
They argue that the ideas of good neighbourhood and European solidarity imply that 
each state bears the responsibility for aliens who have transited its territory on their 
way to a neighbouring state.  
What is basically missing in order to integrate the obligation to readmit third country 
nationals into customary international law is consistent state practice – and this is what 
EU member states are keen to see. By establishing a trend towards such an obligation 
and by including precise descriptions of material and procedural demands on transit 
countries into readmission agreements, the EU is seeking to transform international 
law. When a new norm is widely accepted, it will be integrated into customary 
international law.  
Community readmission agreements are being signed on the basis of the principle of 
reciprocity, which means that all contracting states must be prepared to readmit not 
only their own citizens but even third country nationals on the same terms. However, in 
the case of readmission agreements between the EU on the one hand and non-EU 
member states on the other, the argument of reciprocity is hypocritical because those 
countries with which it is of interest for the EU to conclude agreements would not have 
any problems with expulsions to the EU.5
When EU actors increasingly became aware of the problems in negotiating 
readmission agreements with transit countries and of the problematic consequences 
that readmission agreements entail for them, EU documents began to frequently refer 
to the responsibility of each nation state to control its borders efficiently in order to 
justify its policy: “The objective of readmission is to make the Member States and third 
                                                     
4 Council of the European Union (1999a) and Hailbronner (1997).  
5 The Council had already pointed to this kind of asymmetrical reciprocity much earlier (Council of the 
European Union, 1999b). 
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States take responsibility for the failings of their border control systems” (Council of the 
European Union, 2001b, p. 9).6 It has also been said that readmission agreements 
function as stimuli for more stringent border controls in the transit country.  
3.1.2 Actors in readmission 
By its very nature, readmission concerns three actors: the state that requests 
readmission, the state that is requested to readmit, and the person to be readmitted 
(either irregular migrant or rejected asylum seeker). Their interests are very different. 
While the first two actors decide upon the legal framework of readmission, the third one 
is its mere object. The returning state usually refers to the integrity of its asylum system 
or its migration control system and argues that the electorate is in favour of a restrictive 
control approach. Even though forced return is costly, the expense is considered to be 
lower than the long-term financial costs of not implementing it. The state requested to 
readmit may have economic, demographic or social interests in not readmitting its own 
citizens and even more so third country nationals.  
The person to be readmitted is confronted with the choice between staying in 
irregularity or returning. If the individual is unwilling to return, the returning state might 
react by threatening and then also implementing forced removal.7 Furthermore, the 
authorities of the country of origin or transit might display an uncooperative attitude by 
denying that the individual actually possesses their nationality, by not issuing the 
necessary travel documents, or by objecting to the modalities of return.  
Readmission questions constitute a segment of those policy issues that, when the 
Treaty of Amsterdam took effect, became part of the acquis in the 1st pillar. The 
competence to conclude readmission agreements on behalf of EU member states was 
shifted to the European Community. The European Commission received the mandate 
by member states to negotiate readmission agreements with non-member countries on 
their behalf. However, not all of the EU members participate in readmission policy. 
Since Community readmission agreements are based upon the provision of Title IV of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), they are not applicable to the 
UK and Ireland unless these countries opt-in in the manner provided for by the Protocol 
to the TEC.8 Likewise Community readmission agreements will not extend to Denmark 
by virtue of the Protocol on the position of Denmark.9
                                                     
6 In a later version, the wording was slightly changed in a more positive way: “Readmission makes the 
Member States and the third States responsible for controlling their borders efficiently” (Council of the 
European Union, 2002d).  
7 On the more detailed legal implications of a state’s right to expel individuals, see Noll (1999). 
8 Where one or both of the governments wants to take part in an initiative related to Title IV TEC, they may 
notify the president of the Council within three months. If a measure concerning Title IV TEC has been 
adopted by the Council and Britain and Ireland have not decided to opt-in, both countries can decide at 
any later time to accept that measure. With regard to Community readmission agreements, both countries 
generally tend to participate, but the decision is made on a case-by-case basis. The UK has decided to 
opt-in to all readmission agreements signed so far. In contrast, the Irish government voted against opting-
in to the agreements with Albania and Macao. 
9 Article 1 of this protocol constitutes the Danish opt-out from all measures pursuant to Title IV TEC, and 
the provisions under Article 2 are the same as those used in the British and Irish cases. In contrast to the 
UK and Ireland, however, Denmark lacks the possibility of voluntary opt-in. The only exception is initiatives 
build upon the Schengen acquis under Title IV TEC. Here, Denmark can decide to opt-in within six 
months. But since readmission agreements have been handled as an external matter rather than being 
Schengen-related Denmark has no possibility to opt-in. As a result, some Community readmission 
agreements entail a joint declaration on Denmark in which the country expresses its desire to conclude a 
bilateral readmission agreement with the country at hand in the same terms as the Community agreement. 
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In September 2000, the Commission received the first mandates for negotiations with 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Russia, and Pakistan; in May 2001 with Hong Kong and Macao; in 
June 2002 with Ukraine; and in November 2002 with Albania, Algeria, Turkey, and 
China (Council of the European Union, 2002a). The very detailed mandate was 
prepared by the Expulsion Working Party, rests upon a draft model readmission 
agreement, and does not leave much flexibility to the Commission.  
3.2 Change of mandate in the course of negotiations on EC readmission: 
including visa facilitation 
In 2002, member states started to call for the speeding-up of ongoing readmission 
negotiations – a claim, which has been ever since reiterated at every opportunity.10 At 
the end of the year, the Commission conceded that negotiations on readmission 
agreements had not led to quick results.11 In the following months, the Commission 
repeatedly asked the Council to think about incentives, e.g. more generous visa 
policies, or increased quotas for migrant workers, that might help to obtain the 
cooperation of third countries in the negotiation and conclusion of readmission 
agreements. In that, the Commission implicitly addressed criticism from various 
governments of member states, which had complained repeatedly about too little 
progress in negotiations and had sought to put pressure on the Commission to come 
up with more results. Alongside the difficulties in readmission negotiations, at least 
standard readmission clauses had been approved in 1999 as mandatory elements for 
inclusion in all future association and cooperation agreements by the EC.  
Ongoing difficulties in negotiating readmission agreements forced the governments of 
EU member states to consider how to expand the Commission’s margin during 
negotiations. Gradually it became clear that concessions had to be made and more 
attractive packages would have to be linked to the policy field of migration. In the 
months that followed, visa facilitation became the major compensation matter 
introduced by third countries in negotiations with the EU. Besides the very special 
cases of Hong Kong and Macao, the most successful link between readmission and 
visas has been made by the Russian Federation. In July 2004, the Council authorised 
the Commission to negotiate not only on readmission but even on visa facilitation 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004, p. 12). Shortly afterwards, the link 
between readmission and visa facilitation became official for Ukraine, too. Even China 
officially asked the Community, in May 2004, to negotiate on visa facilitation in parallel 
with negotiations on readmission.12 In the multi-annual programme on strengthening 
freedom, security, and justice (the so-called Hague Programme), member states finally 
referred to the Commission’s call and agreed to further examine a possible link 
between readmission and visa facilitation: 
The European Council (…) invites the Council and the Commission to 
examine, with a view to developing a common approach, whether in the 
                                                                                                                                                           
Similarly, these Community readmission agreements include a joint declaration on the intention of Iceland 
and Norway to sign bilateral readmission agreements with the respective third countries because these 
countries participate in the Schengen agreements. 
10 Commission of the European Communities (2002b). 
11 Ibid. See also Commission of the European Communities (2003b). 
12 With regard to China, an important agreement, the Destination Status Agreement, had already taken a 
first step towards visa facilitation in February 2004. It incorporated a readmission clause as a ‘quid pro 
quo’ which essentially means visa facilitation for group visits of Chinese tourists to the EU.  
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context of the EC readmission policy it would be opportune to facilitate, on 
a case by case basis, the issuance of short-stay visas to third-country 
nationals, where possible and on a basis of reciprocity, as part of a real 
partnership in external relations, including migration-related issues (Council 
of the European Union, 2004, p. 18).  
As Table 1 shows, by the time the negotiations with the Western Balkan countries 
started in 2006, the link between readmission and visa facilitation had become 
acceptable for EU member states so that negotiations were combined from the very 
beginning.  
Table 1. EC Visa Facilitation (VF) and Readmission Agreements (RA): State of 
Negotiations  
Country Type of 
Agreement 
Negotiation 
Mandate 
Start of 
Negotiations
End of 
Negotiations 
Entering 
into 
Force 
Albania RA Nov 2002 March 2003 April 2005 May 2006 
 VF Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
Bosnia  RA Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
 VF Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
Hong Kong RA May 2001 June 2001 Nov 2002 March 2004 
 VF* -- -- -- -- 
Macao RA May 2001 July 2001 Oct 2003 June 2004 
 VF* -- -- -- -- 
Macedonia RA Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
 VF Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
Moldova RA Dec 2006 Feb 2007 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
 VF Dec 2006 Feb 2007 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
Montenegro RA Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
 VF Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
Russia RA Sept 2000 April 2001 May 2006 June 2007° 
 VF July 2004 June 2005 May 2006 June 2007 
Serbia RA Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
 VF Nov 2006 Nov 2006 Nov 2007 Jan 2008 
Sri Lanka RA Sept 2000 April 2001 Feb 2002 May 2005 
 VF -- -- -- -- 
Ukraine RA Feb 2002 August 2002 Oct 2006 Jan 2008^ 
 VF Nov 2005 Nov 2005 Oct 2006 Jan 2008 
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Ongoing Negotiations    
Algeria RA Nov 2002 June 2005   
 VF     
China RA Nov 2002 April 2004   
 VF     
Morocco RA Sept 2000 May 2001   
 VF     
Pakistan RA Sept 2000 April 2001   
 VF     
Turkey RA Nov 2002 March 2003   
 VF     
* Hong Kong and Macao were exempted from visa requirements in December 2000 
° The provisions on the readmission of third country nationals and stateless people will only 
become applicable after a transitional period of 3 years. 
^ The provisions on the readmission of third country nationals and stateless people will only 
become applicable after a transitional period of 2 years. 
3.3 The test case: visa facilitation and readmission agreements with the Western 
Balkans  
The Western Balkan states have particularly close relations with the EU. After the 
Kosovo war in 1999, the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process and 
granted the non-member states of South Eastern Europe the status of “potential 
candidates for EU membership” (European Council, 2000). The EU’s pre-accession 
strategy was modelled on the experiences of the Eastern Enlargement although 
containing some distinctive features, such as the unusually broad range of political and 
economic conditions (for more details, see Noutcheva, 2007; Trauner, 2007). The EC 
visa facilitation and readmission agreements to be signed with the Western Balkans 
were intended to intensify the cooperation on reducing irregular immigration, and, at 
the same time, bringing relaxation to the tight visa regime the EU had imposed on 
these countries. Through this, the agreements should be beneficial to both sides. 
Whereas the EU had a better means to deal with irregular migration transiting or 
stemming from the Balkans, the countries would come closer to a visa-free regime – an 
objective they were persistently lobbying for. Of the aspiring candidates in the Western 
Balkans, only Croatia is visa-free (Council of the European Union, 2001a).  
Since the Western Balkan states were placed on the EU’s negative visa list in 2001, 
they were hoping for a quick visa liberalisation scheme. However, the EU recognised a 
free-visa regime as a long term objective only. The 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda first 
introduced the prospect of a liberalised visa regime, once certain conditions have been 
met:  
The EU is aware of the importance the peoples and governments in the 
Western Balkans attach to the perspective of liberalisation of the visa 
regime. Meanwhile, progress is dependent on these countries 
implementing major reforms in areas such as the strengthening of the rule 
of law, combating organised crime, corruption and illegal migration, and 
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strengthening their administrative capacity in border control and security in 
documents (Council of the European Union, 2003b). 
Based on the Thessaloniki Agenda, the Commission conducted exploratory talks with 
each of the Western Balkan countries. The relaxation of the visa regime was not only 
linked to the signing of an EC readmission agreements but more broadly to “substantial 
efforts by the countries in question” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2006c, p.9). Due to the political salience of the issue in the Western Balkans, the 
promise of visa liberalisation has provided the EU with a particular strong lever. The 
Commission defined that through a ‘case by case approach’ each Western Balkan 
state may achieve visa liberalisation on its own merit. In addition, the countries’ status 
as candidates or potential candidates should be taken into account (Ibid).  
The very concrete go-ahead for the Commission to launch negotiations on EC visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements was granted on the Council meeting held on 
13 and 14 November 2006. The Commission initiated the negotiations with the 
countries in November 2006, except for Albania whose readmission agreement with 
the EC entered into force on 1 May 2006. In that case, the negotiations on a visa 
facilitation agreement started on 13 December 2006. All agreements were officially 
signed in September 2007 and entered into force on 1 January 2008.  
EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements are now a major means to push for 
further reforms. The European Commissioner Franco Frattini specified that 
negotiations for visa-free travel can only be started if a smooth and efficient functioning 
of visa facilitation and the readmission practices is guaranteed, along with efforts to 
improve effective cross-border police cooperation and measures against corruption 
(Frattini, 2006). According to the Commission enlargement strategy for 2008/9, each of 
the target countries will receive a ‘roadmap’ defining the exact conditions to be met. 
These documents will deal with the effective implementation of the readmission 
agreement, and cover other key areas such as border management, document security 
and measures against organised crime. “Such road-maps will allow the countries 
concerned to better focus their reform efforts, while also reinforcing the visibility of the 
EU’s commitment to the peoples of the region” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007c, p. 13).  
In brief, the Western Balkans qualified perfectly for testing the package of visa 
facilitation and readmission. These countries aspiring to join the EU have relatively 
close institutional ties with the EU and are in the immediate neighbourhood. The 
experiences gained in this geographical setting provided the EU with a model to be 
used in several neighbouring states. According to the European Commissioner Franco 
Frattini, the EU seeks to enhance the EU’s internal security “through global visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements aimed in the longer term at the Union’s 
neighbourhood countries, on the model currently being developed in the Balkans” 
(Agence Europe, 04/05/2006).  
3.4 Is there a clear EU strategy on visa facilitation and readmission in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy? 
As mentioned earlier, the link between visa facilitation and readmission was made for 
the first time with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. When their negotiations on 
an EC readmission agreement did not advance, the EU linked the negotiations to the 
incentive of visa facilitation. With Moldova being the next neighbouring state, visa 
facilitation and readmission were commonly negotiated right from the start. The EC-
Moldovan negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission started in February 2007 
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and lasted until November 2007 with both agreements entering into force on 1 January 
2008. Of course, after the end of negotiations with these countries the question 
remains: are they exceptional cases or rather pioneers that other neighbouring states 
may follow? Does the European Neighbourhood Policy contain a clear strategy on visa 
facilitation and readmission? 
The basic set-up of the European Neighbourhood Policy was outlined in the European 
Commission’s Communication on a ‘Wider Europe’, published in March 2003, followed 
by the more developed strategy on the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’, published in 
May 2004. In the documents, the Commission did not delineate a clear strategy on visa 
facilitation and readmission. The ‘Wider Europe’ document only vaguely mentioned that 
the “EU could also consider the possibilities for facilitating the movement of citizens of 
neighbouring countries participating in EU programmes and activities” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2003a, p. 11). Holders of diplomatic and service passports 
should also possibly benefit from visa facilitation. On readmission, the documents were 
more precise. “Concluding readmission agreement with all the neighbours, starting with 
Morocco, Russia, Algeria, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, will be an essential element 
in joint efforts to curb illegal migration” (Ibid).  
Over time, the EU shaped a more precise strategy in the field. EC visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements are now considered a standard instrument in the ENP. The 
reasons for this strategic shift are twofold. On the one hand, the negotiations on an EC 
visa facilitation and readmission agreement with Ukraine, the Russian Federation and 
Moldova clarified how useful the incentive of visa facilitation is to achieve the objective 
of signing readmission agreements. On the other hand, more and more reports 
emphasising the negative perceptions of the ongoing visa practices made EU member 
states rethink their visa policy. The EU had to admit that “the length and cost of 
procedures for short-term visas (e.g. for business, researchers, students, tourists or 
even official travel) is a highly ‘visible’ disincentive to partner countries, and an obstacle 
to many of the ENP’s underlying objectives” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006a, pp. 3-4). When in 2006 the German Presidency intended to 
strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy, visa facilitation became a major 
means to dispel the doubts of the ENP countries that the EU was not willing to make 
serious concessions. In its communication on how to strengthen the ENP, the 
Commission proposed that the “Union should be willing to enter negotiations on 
readmission and visa facilitation with each neighbouring country with an Action Plan in 
force, once the proper preconditions have been met” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006a, p.6, emphasis added).  
Hence, a major precondition is an ENP Action Plan in force. Most participating states 
now fulfil this requirement. Action Plans were agreed with Israel, Jordan Moldova, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine in 2005, with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2006, and with Egypt and Lebanon in 2007. The other 
countries neighbouring the EU do not yet have such an agreement: Belarus, Libya and 
Syria are still excluded from the ENP structures;13 Algeria has decided not to negotiate 
an ENP Action Plan yet; and Russia refrained from participating in the ENP but agreed 
with the EU on a Strategic Partnership covering four “common spaces”.  
 
                                                     
13 For a detailed analysis of the EU-Belarus relations, see G. Dura (2008), The EU’s Limited Response to 
Belarus’ Pseudo ‘New Foreign Policy’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 151, CEPS, Brussels, February 2008. 
 22
F. Trauner, I. Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements ..... 
Table 2. Specific Action on Visa Facilitation and Readmission in the ENP Action Plans 
 
ENP 
Action 
Plan 
Specific action on visa 
facilitation in ENP Action 
Plan 
Specific action on 
readmission in ENP Action 
Plan 
Algeria No   
Armenia Yes “exchange views on visa issues” 
“initiate dialogue on 
readmission which could 
possibly lead to an EC – 
Armenia readmission 
agreement” 
Azerbaijan  “exchange views on visa issues” 
“initiate dialogue on 
readmission which could 
possibly lead in the future to 
an EC-Azerbaijan agreement 
in this area” 
Belarus No   
Egypt Yes 
“Cooperate in the field of 
improving the movement of 
persons, including to facilitate 
the uniform visa issuing 
procedures for certain agreed 
categories of persons” 
“Develop the cooperation 
between Egypt and EU on 
readmission, including 
negotiating readmission 
agreements between the 
parties, building on Article 69 
of the Association Agreement” 
Georgia Yes “exchange information on visa issues” 
“Strengthen the dialogue and 
cooperation in preventing and 
fighting against illegal 
migration, which could possibly 
lead in the future to an EC-
Georgia agreement on 
readmission” 
Israel Yes No short stay visa requirements No specific action 
Jordan Yes 
“In order to facilitate the 
circulation of persons, examine 
… possibilities of facilitation 
visa issuing (simplified and 
accelerated procedures in 
conformity with the acquis)” 
No specific action 
Lebanon Yes 
“Cooperate on facilitating the 
movement of persons … in 
particular examining the scope 
for facilitating visa procedures 
for short stay for some 
categories of persons” 
“Improve cooperation … on all 
forms of readmission including 
the possibility of negotiating a 
readmission agreement” 
Libya No   
Moldova Yes “initiate a dialogue on the possibilities of visa facilitation” 
“Initiate a dialogue on 
readmission in the perspective 
of concluding a readmission 
agreement between Moldova 
and EU” 
Morocco Yes “constructive dialogue “conclusion and 
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…including examination of visa 
facilitation” 
implementation of balanced 
readmission agreement with 
the EC” 
Palestinian 
Authority Yes No specific action No specific action 
Syria No   
Tunisia Yes 
“facilitating the movement of 
persons … by looking in 
particular at possibilities of 
relaxing short-stay visa 
formalities for certain 
categories of persons” 
“initiate a dialogue on return 
and readmission with a view to 
concluding a readmission 
agreement with the EU” 
Ukraine  “establish constructive dialogue on visa facilitation” 
“need for progress on the 
ongoing negotiations for an 
EC-Ukraine readmission 
agreement” 
Source: ENP Action Plans and Country Reports, downloadable on the homepage of the 
European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm (last accessed 
on 30 January 2008).  
The figure shows that even though theoretically each neighbouring state may conclude 
an EC visa facilitation and readmission agreement, the concrete action in this field 
differ amongst them. In the visa domain, most often the clauses are rather vague 
referring to commonplaces such as “establishing constructive dialogues” or “exchange 
views”. In an interview for this analysis, a Commission official stated that if new EC visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements are to be negotiated, the Black Sea area 
would be treated as a priority. There is a tendency to consider this “fashionable area” 
first, according to an EU official.14  
EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements may also become an important 
element in the EU’s efforts to develop a new ‘global approach on migration’. A different, 
more comprehensive migration policy was defined as a core objective at the October 
2005 Summit at Hampton Court. Following the summit, the Commission proposed a 
whole set of new measures on irregular and legal migration focusing in geographic 
terms on Africa and the Mediterranean region. Under the heading of “Legal Migration”, 
the establishment of “mobility packages” with a range of interested third countries was 
recommended:  
There is a clear need to better organise the various forms of legal 
movement between the EU and third countries. Mobility packages would 
provide the overall framework for managing such movements and would 
bring together the possibilities offered by the Member States and the 
European Community, while fully respecting the division of competences as 
provided by the Treaty (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b, 
p. 7).  
Mobility packages would then be the heading to manage legal migration flows with 
selected third countries, particularly from the neighbourhood, provided that they prove 
willing to cooperate on readmission, irregular migration and border management. 
These packages go beyond facilitated travel opportunities and also incorporate ideas 
                                                     
14 Authors’ interview with EU official, 18 January 2008. 
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on promoting circular migration (temporary or seasonal migration) and legal migration 
based on the labour needs of interested EU member states.15 In this privileged form of 
cooperation with selected third countries, visa facilitation and readmission policies will 
only be two components in a comprehensive cooperation on migration issues. In 
exchange for receiving new opportunities for legal migration, the third countries 
concerned will have to agree on far-reaching commitments that may even include 
measures “to promote productive employment and decent work, and more generally to 
improve the economic and social framework conditions […] as they may contribute to 
reducing the incentives for irregular migration” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007b, p. 4). 
In contrast, the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries are not considered as 
qualifying for EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. The Cotonou 
agreement is regarded as a sufficient basis to make ACP countries cooperate on 
readmission. “The readmission obligations contained in Article 13 Cotonou is crucial, 
and is an appropriate basis for supplementary bilateral readmission agreements 
between EU Member States and selected ACP countries” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006b, p. 9). 
 
4. The content and implications of EC visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements  
 
This section analyses the EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements in terms of 
substance and implications. They are considered in relation to each other and 
systematically assessed in terms of their similarities and differences.  
4.1  The content of EC visa facilitation agreements  
This part evaluates the visa facilitation agreements concluded with Serbia (2007f), 
Montenegro (2007e), Macedonia (2007b), Albania (2007c), Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2007a), Moldova (2007d), Ukraine (2007h) and Russia (2007g) in terms of substance 
and content. 
The main purpose of the visa facilitation agreements is to facilitate, on the basis of 
reciprocity, the issuance of short-stay visas (90 days per period of 180 days). Long-
stay visas remain within the authority of the member states. A visa-free travel regime is 
recognised in all agreements as the long-term objective. The wording of this objective 
differs slightly, however. In the visa facilitation agreement with Ukraine and Moldova 
the EU recognises the “introduction of a visa free travel regime […] as a long-term 
objective”. A similar clause is included in the agreement with Russia, where the parties 
reaffirmed “the intention to establish the visa-free travel”. The clearest statement for 
visa liberalisation was made in the agreements with the Western Balkans. In all 
agreements with the Western Balkan states, it was seen as the “first concrete step 
towards the visa free travel regime”.  
                                                     
15 The challenge in negotiating mobility packages is that they touch on areas of EU member state national 
competence as well as others that fall within the Community’s remit. For more details, see the 
Commission’s communiqué (2007b) on circular migration and mobility partnerships. 
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The main section of the EC visa facilitation agreements concern which categories of 
citizens may benefit from facilitated visa procedures. Attached to each category is the 
documentary evidence regarding the purpose of the journey. All EC visa facilitation 
agreements under research here include the following categories of citizens: 
a) members of official delegations participating in meetings, consultations, 
negotiations, exchange programmes and events (in possession of official invitation) 
b) business people and representatives of business organisations (with written 
request from a host legal person or company) 
c) drivers of international cargo and passenger transportation services (with written 
request from the national association of carriers) 
d) members of train, refrigerator and locomotive crews in international trains (with 
approval of competent company) 
e) journalists (with certificate) 
f) scientists and persons active in cultural and artistic activities, including university 
and other exchange programmes (with written request from host organisation) 
g) pupils, students, post-graduate students and accompanying teachers (with written 
request or a certificate of enrolment from the host university) 
h) participants in international sports events and persons accompanying them (with 
written request from the host organisation) 
i) participants in official exchange with twin towns (with approval of host mayor) 
j) close relatives (spouse, children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren) visiting 
their family legally residing in the EU (with written request) 
k) relatives visiting for military or civil burial grounds (with official document confirming 
the fact of death). 
The agreement with Russia stops at this point. The one with Ukraine (and all others) 
include also the category of  
l) persons visiting for medical reasons (with official document from host medical 
institution).  
The EC visa facilitation agreements with Moldova and the Western Balkans contain: 
m) civil society organisations when undertaking trips for the purposes of educational 
training, seminars, conferences (with request from host institution) 
n) professionals who participate in international exhibitions, conferences, symposia, 
seminars or similar events (with written request from host organisation) 
The agreements with the Western Balkan states are the farthest-reaching. They also 
include 
o) tourists (with certificate or voucher from a travel agency or a tour operator)  
p) religious communities (with approval from registered religious community) 
Only the one with Albania contains  
q) persons politically persecuted during the communist regime (with a certificate 
issued by the Institute for the Integration of the Persecuted Persons)  
 26
F. Trauner, I. Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements ..... 
The agreements are almost identical in their wording. The ordering of the categories 
differs, however. Interestingly, the visa facilitation agreement with Macedonia is the 
only one that does not begin with “members of official delegations” but with students, 
scientists and members of the civil community. In term of categories of persons eligible 
for multiple-entry visas, the visa facilitation agreements with the Western Balkan states 
are again the more comprehensive ones. All categories mentioned beforehand may 
apply for a multiple entry-visa with the exception of tourists. However, only members of 
official delegations, national or regional governments and parliaments, close family 
members visiting their relatives in the EU, business people and journalists may apply 
for a multiple-entry visa with a term of validity up to five years. The multiple-entry visa 
for all other categories may be valid for one year only.  
The agreements fix the fee for processing visa applications for all citizens of the target 
country at €35. In the EC visa facilitation agreements with Russia and Ukraine, a 
clause adds that the fees increase to €70, if the request is urgent (3 days before 
departure). However, there are some reservations to this stipulation e.g. close 
relatives, pupils and students will continue to pay the reduced fee of €35 even if the 
request is urgent.16  
The EC visa facilitation agreements provide certain categories of citizens with the 
waiving of the visa fees. The least comprehensive agreement in terms of persons 
benefiting from the waiving of the visa fee is the EC-Russian visa facilitation 
agreement, followed by the ones with Ukraine and Moldova.  
Table 3. Categories of Persons Benefiting from a Waiving of the Visa Fee 
 Russia Ukraine Moldova Western Balkan states 
close relatives 
(spouses, children, parents, 
grandparents, grandchildren) 
X X X X 
members of official delegations 
members X X X X 
regional or national government 
and parliaments, Constitutional 
Courts or Supreme Courts 
X X X  
pupils, students and post-graduate 
students and accompanying 
teachers 
X X X X 
disabled persons and those 
accompanying them X X X X 
persons travelling on humanitarian 
grounds, including medical 
purposes 
X X X X 
participants in international sports 
events and persons accompanying 
them 
 X X X 
participants in youth international 
sports events X    
participants in scientific, cultural X X X X 
                                                     
16 The category of people which may not be target by the later clause is considerably longer in the EC-
Ukraine agreement than in the EC-Russia one. 
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and artistic activities 
participants in official exchange 
programmes organised by twin 
cities 
X X X X 
journalists  X X X 
pensioners  X X X 
drivers of international cargo and 
passenger transportation  X X X 
members of train, refrigerator and 
locomotive crews  X X X 
children under the age of 18 and 
dependent children under the age 
of 21 
 X   
members of professions 
participating in international 
exhibitions, conferences, 
symposia, seminars or similar 
events 
  X X 
participants representatives of civil 
society organisations    X 
representatives of religious 
communities    X 
Children under the age of 6.    X 
mayors and members of municipal 
councils    Only Macedonia 
Politically persecuted persons 
during the communist regime    Only Albania 
Source: Authors’ summary compiled from EC visa facilitation agreements Serbia (2007f), 
Montenegro (2007e), Macedonia (2007b), Albania (2007c), Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2007a), Moldova (2007d), Ukraine (2007h)and Russia (2007g). 
The agreements with Macedonia and Serbia contain the additional clause that Bulgaria 
and Romania, both of which are not yet bound by the Schengen acquis, may also 
waive the fees for processing national short stay visas for citizens of those two 
countries. 
The decision on the visa application shall be taken within ten calendar days. This 
period, may be extended up to 30 calendar days, notably when further scrutiny of the 
person applying is needed. The agreements are jointly managed and monitored by a 
committee composed of Commission officials, assisted by experts from the member 
states, and the partner countries’ officials. The committee may suggest amendments or 
additions to the present agreement and settle disputes arising from it. It meets at least 
once a year but may do so more often, if necessary.  
A Protocol annexed to the agreement clarifies the implications of the agreement for the 
states that do not fully apply the Schengen acquis. The UK and Ireland, not included in 
the territorial validity of the agreement, were invited to conclude bilateral agreements. 
The EC visa facilitation agreements do not apply to Denmark, Iceland and Norway 
either, which were asked to conclude bilateral agreements, in similar terms, with target 
third-countries.  
In some agreements, a special reference was made to EC Regulation No 1931/2006 
concerning the establishment of a system of local border traffic. Hungary, Poland, 
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Slovakia and Romania declared their willingness to negotiate a local border traffic 
regime with Ukraine. In the Western Balkans, Macedonia will negotiate one with 
Bulgaria, Serbia another with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Moldova and Romania 
also declared their willingness to establish a local border traffic regime.  
The agreements intend to make the procedures for issuing short stay visas more 
transparent. Better information on the validity, the documents necessary and minimum 
requirements shall be given. The visa facilitation agreement with Moldova is the only 
one that declares the intention to improve the EU presence in the country and set up a 
common application centre in Chisinau. The visa facilitation agreements with the 
Western Balkans end by acknowledging their intention to “give a wider definition to the 
notion of family members that should benefit from visa facilitation”. The wish 
particularly concerns siblings and their children. “The European Community invites the 
Member States’ consular offices to make full use of the existing possibilities in the 
acquis communautaire for facilitating the issuance of visas to this category of persons, 
including in particular, the simplification of documentary evidence requested for the 
applicants, exemptions from handling fees and where appropriate the issuance of 
multiple entry visas”.  
4.2 The implications on the visa facilitation side  
The EC visa facilitation agreements with Russia entered into force in June 2007 and 
those with Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans on 1 January 2008. Due to this 
short period, it is too early to assess the impact of the visa facilitation agreements in 
terms of modified visa data. According to the visa data collection of Council secretariat 
and Commission, the EU member states issued 11,709,251 visas worldwide in 2005.17  
Table 4. EU Visa data for the year 2005 
Group 1  Group 2  
Russia 2,833,392 China 592,644 
Ukraine 1,348,162 India 292,861 
Belarus 629,849 Iran 104,898 
Serbia & Montenegro 541,244 Kazakhstan 104,166 
Turkey 532,177 Lebanon 74,299 
Albania 136,569 Indonesia 67,931 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 128,750 Pakistan 40,243 
Moldova 61,941 Syria 37,708 
Georgia 40,322 Vietnam 35,372 
Armenia 21,911 Jordan 31,449 
Croatia 17,545 Sri Lanka 16,984 
Azerbaijan 16,541 Uzbekistan 12,232 
Macedonia 14,066 Bangladesh 11,808 
  Kirgizstan 8,930 
  Iraq 6,563 
                                                     
17 Unfortunately, the data is presented in such a way that it cannot be determined if only Schengen visas 
are included, i.e. short stay visas in the Schengen area, or also national long stay visas.  
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  Turkmenistan 4,033 
  Afghanistan 3,526 
  Tajikistan 1,735 
Total Group 1 6,322,469 Total Group 2 1,447,382 
Information: Transit A visas are not included.  
Source: Visa data collection managed by the Council secretariat and the Commission 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007a, p. 78). 
In terms of substance, the EC visa facilitation agreements with the Western Balkans 
are the more comprehensive ones. They contain the clearest statement for visa-free 
travel and more categories of citizens that benefit from facilitated travel, including 
tourists in particular. The EC-Russian visa facilitation agreement is at the other end of 
the scale. “The present – not very ambitious – agreement on the facilitation of visas is 
an example of the essentially pragmatic way in which [the EU-Russian] relations are 
unfolding”, according to the assessment of the European Parliament (European 
Parliament, 2006, p. 6). It considered the agreement lacking a “human rights and 
democracy clause” and demands that “conditionality must also be a cornerstone of EU 
external policy on visas”, particularly with regard to the “rules of democracy and the 
rule of law” (European Parliament, 2006, p. 9).  
The benefit of all EC visa facilitation agreements is to fix the price for processing the 
visa application for all citizens at €35, and to waive the fees for certain categories of 
persons. Therefore the target countries are not affected by the Council Decision of 1 
June 2006 which “readjusted” the visa application processing costs at €60 “to cover the 
additional costs […] corresponding to the introduction of biometrics and the VIS” 
(Council of the European Union, 2006).  
However, viewed from the perspective of the target countries, the fixing of the prize at 
€35 does not imply a positive change but rather the prolongation or, in some cases, a 
deterioration of the status quo. In terms of applying for a short-stay visa to the long-
term participating Schengen states, the situation remains unchanged. Third-country 
citizens travelling to, say, Spain or Germany continue to pay the same amount, as 
opposed to the increased fee of €60. In terms of applying for a short-stay visa to the 
new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, the situation deteriorated despite 
the EC visa facilitation agreement entering into force. On December 21st, 2007, the 
new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (with the exception of Cyprus, 
Bulgaria and Romania) joined the Schengen area and lifted their border controls to the 
West. The transitional period, i.e. the period after these states obtained membership 
but prior to their full implementation of the Schengen Treaty, came to an end. Within 
this transitional period, the new member states were allowed to issue visas for 
neighbouring states free of charge or for a low fee and on relatively uncomplicated 
terms. Poland, for instance, issued 560,000 visas annually for Ukraine citizens which is 
nearly double as many as all Schengen states combined (290,000) (Boratynski et al., 
2006b, pp. 2-3). The visa procedures were not only cheaper or free of charge, but also 
the procedures were simpler, the waiting time shorter and the rejection rate significantly 
lower (in case of Poland for Ukraine 1.2% as compared to 11.5% in case of the 
Schengen states (Ibid). In accordance to the Schengen acquis, the new member states 
are now in charge of controlling the external Schengen border which implies the full 
adherence of the strict Schengen entry rules. Instead of issuing visas free of charge, 
countries such as Poland now have to charge €35 for issuing a short-stay visa. The EC 
visa facilitation agreements do not provide for special arrangements for the new 
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member states vis-à-vis their neighbours. Hence, “paradoxically, though in principle the 
[visa facilitation] agreement is to ease the situation, after the New Member States 
accession to the Schengen area, it will worsen” (Boratynski et al., 2006b, p. 3).18
There is one measure, however, that should explicitly prevent negative side-effects of 
the Schengen Eastern Enlargement: the establishment of local border traffic regimes. 
The issuing of ‘local border traffic permits’ for border residents is an important measure 
to foster good neighbourly relations between border regions at the EU’s external 
borders. As mentioned above, there are close socio-economic links between the new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe and their neighbours to the East and 
South-East. Many families still manage subsistence on shuttle-trading of foodstuff or 
other goods in between the border regions. For them, an uncomplicated crossing of the 
EU external border is of high interest. The local border traffic concerns residents living 
in a border zone of 50 km and authorises them to move freely in the border zones of 
both countries. Due to this set-up, however, the local border traffic regime potentially 
affects only a comparatively small number of citizens in a closely circumscribed area. 
At the Ukrainian border with Poland, the local border traffic may include only Uzhhorod 
as a larger town with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Boratynski et al., 2006b, p. 3). It 
is also worth mentioning that residents of border regions often search for other, more 
comprehensive venues to move freely into the EU. A comparatively unproblematic way 
for citizens of countries such as Moldova or Macedonia has been to benefit from the 
neighbouring country’s status as EU member state. Many Macedonians have therefore 
applied for a Bulgarian passport, many Moldovans for a Romanian or Bulgarian one. 
Angel Marin, Bulgaria’s vice president, announced in January 2008 that “between 2002 
and 2007, some 39,000 Macedonians and as many Moldovans applied for Bulgarian 
passports. […] Of those, some 13,925 Macedonians and 10,613 Moldovans were 
granted passports” (quoted in EU business, 2008). In Moldova, there is a Bulgarian 
minority of 60,000 to 80,000 and in Macedonia, Bulgaria considers the country’s Slavic 
population as being of Bulgarian origin and therefore easily grants passports (Ibid). EU 
officials are aware of the seriousness of this problem. In an interview, a high diplomat 
of an EU member state voiced concerns that  
the Bulgarians will come sooner or later to claim territory from the 
Macedonian state when one day the majority [in some border regions to 
Bulgaria] will possess a Bulgarian citizenship. Once, they will even 
somehow understandably pose the question: What is the foundation of 
statehood in these areas?19 
In light of this development, it is questionable if the local border traffic is a sufficient 
answer although it clearly is an asset to many border residents living at the EU’s 
external border.  
The waiving of the visa fees for certain parts of the population, the speedier processing 
of the visa application (normally 10 calendar days), the possibility of multiple-entry 
visas to certain categories of people and a shorter list of documents required are plus 
points the EC visa facilitation agreements bring about. The visa procedures, including 
the length of the visa application procedure and the long list of documents required, 
were often conceived as troublesome and lacking transparency. According to an EU 
visa policy monitoring survey of eight EU member states in four Eastern European 
countries conducted by the Stefan Batory Foundation (Boratynski et al., 2006a), the 
                                                     
18 The scholars draw this conclusion by assessing the EC-Ukraine visa facilitation agreement.  
19 Authors’ interview with EU member state official in Skopje, 2 May 2006. 
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length of procedures differed considerably among the EU member states, ranging on 
average from two days in the case of Poland over eight days in Germany up to 14 days 
in the case of the Czech Republic. What is more, the consular practices on how to 
issue a short stay visa equally differed among EU member states. Applicants were 
frequently required to wait for hours in queues, did not receive reliable information on 
which documents were needed, and, in case a document was lacking, needed to return 
personally with the missing one. Usually consulates do not accept documents sent by 
post or e-mail, implying that the applicant has to come again. As the relevant consulate 
is usually a long distance from the applicant’s place (according to the EU visa policy 
monitoring survey (2006a, p. 18), the average distance to the closest consulate was 
300 km) the numerous visits may turn out to be costly and burdensome. Getting a 
Schengen visa could therefore be a “bureaucratic and costly nightmare”, as once even 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (2006) admitted. The EC visa facilitation 
agreements explicitly aim at making these bureaucratic routines less cumbersome and 
more transparent, notably through the newly installed joint committee. It is in charge of 
providing for a smooth implementation of the agreement and of suggesting 
amendments or additions to the agreement. Therefore the committee may assume an 
important role in ensuring fair and transparent visa application procedures. The smooth 
implementation of the agreement is of particular relevance in view of visa liberalisation 
as a long-term objective.  
The EC visa facilitation agreements have one major disadvantage, however. They 
divide the society of the target country into two groups  
the privileged few who can get a multiple-entry visa, benefit from the 
simplified procedure […], or profit from the waiving of the application fee for 
the visa, and as to the remainder: the vast majority of ordinary citizens who 
cannot enjoy such advantages. This can create a feeling of discrimination 
and lead to the conclusion that the European Union is interested only in the 
[…] elite (Boratynski et al., 2006b, p. 2). 
A self-evident implication of this separation is that the non-privileged ones may try to 
obtain the same advantages than the privileged ones possibly leading to an increased 
level of corruption. Some may attempt a bribe to get also the privileged status of, say, a 
journalist or a driver of international cargo. 
It is still too early to assess the quality of the implementation of the EC visa facilitation 
agreements. In interviews for this analysis, some experts pointed to initial problems in 
implementing the stipulations of the agreements, however. Certain EU member states 
would circumvent the reduced fee of €35 by charging additional fees for processing the 
visa application. Such practices were reported by the French consulate in Russia and 
by several EU member states in Ukraine. In Ukraine, another problem would be that 
EU member states had not received updated instructions on how to issue visas under 
the EC visa facilitation agreement by the time the agreement entered into force. 
Therefore, despite the new stipulations in force, the bureaucratic practices have 
hitherto not changed significantly.20
                                                     
20 Authors’ interviews with EU official, 18 January 2008, and Ukrainian specialist on visa policy, 25 January 
2008.  
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4.3 The content of EC readmission agreements  
Readmission agreements generally cover procedural provisions regarding return 
procedure, transit return arrangements, responsibility criteria, standard of proof, time 
limits and cost distribution, although the exact nature of these procedures can vary 
significantly. The most difficult issue to agree upon is the readmission of third country 
nationals and stateless persons. The contestable points lie in approving the travel route 
of those migrants and providing evidence of the fact that they had transited the country 
before entering the EU’s territory. The proof of nationality is highly critical, too. 
According to the European Commission, other controversial technical issues include 
the time limits applicable, the use of the EU standard travel document for expulsion, the 
means of evidence including prima facie evidence, and the use of charter flights 
(Schieffer, 2003, p. 354). In addition, the relation between a new Community 
agreement and possibly existing bilateral agreements with individual member states 
will have to be assessed. 
The European Commission pursues a standard approach in negotiating readmission 
agreements with third countries and seeks to achieve final texts that have as many 
common features as possible. Thus, the EU’s set of demands and expectations is the 
same for each of the third countries. The first draft of the texts that the Commission 
transmits to its negotiation partners typically does not vary widely. During negotiations, 
single adjustments are required according to the respective country’s objections and 
demands, so that ultimately agreements will differ. 
The readmission agreements the Community signed so far with Albania, Bosnia, Hong 
Kong, Macao, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and 
Ukraine, are divided into seven or eight sections with 21 to 23 articles altogether: 
• Purpose of the agreement: rapid and effective procedures for identification and 
repatriation of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry, 
residence or presence; 
• Definitions; 
• Readmission obligations: covering own nationals, third country nationals and 
stateless persons; 
• Readmission procedure: time limits, common application forms, means of evidence, 
transfer modalities, modes of transport; 
• Transit operations: extent of support to be given by the requested state; 
circumstances to refuse or revoke transit permission; 
• Costs, data protection and non-affection of international rights and obligations; 
• Implementation and practical application; 
• Final provisions: entry into force, duration, termination, and legal status of annexes. 
All agreements include several annexes regarding documents considered as proof or 
prima facie evidence of nationality, and of proof or prima facie evidence of the 
conditions for readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons. Some of 
them also contain common statements regarding the meaning of the agreement for 
Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. 
Besides this overall similar structure, substantial differences in the agreements exist: 
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• Readmission obligations of the signatories: Ukraine is the only country for which the 
agreement does not differentiate between the obligations by the Community on the 
one hand and the contracting state on the other hand. 
• Persons to be readmitted: The agreements with Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro and Serbia explicitly state that signatories shall also readmit minor 
unmarried children of the person to be readmitted as well as spouses holding 
another nationality unless they have an independent right of residence. The 
agreements with Russia and Ukraine require readmission “irrespective of the will of 
the person to be readmitted”. 
• Readmission procedure: Several states have introduced an accelerated procedure 
if a person has been apprehended in the border region after irregularly crossing the 
border coming directly from the territory of the requested state (Macedonia, 
Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine). In this case, the requesting state may submit a 
readmission application within two working days of this person’s apprehension. 
• Time limits: The time limit for submitting a readmission application varies between 
six (Moldova) and twelve (Albania) months. The time limit for replying to the 
application varies between 10 working days (Serbia) and 25 calendar days 
(Russia). Possible extensions lay in between 2 working days (Moldova) and 60 
calendar days (Russia). The requested validity of readmission travel documents lies 
between 30 days (Russia) and six months (Albania). The requesting state has to 
decide about a transit procedure in a certain time period, which varies between 4 
(Moldova) and 10 (Ukraine) working days. For Russia, no time limit has been 
specified. 
• Transit procedure: Ukraine is the only country specifying conditions for escorts in 
case of transit of third-country nationals or stateless persons. 
• Entry into force: The obligations concerning the readmission of third-country 
nationals and stateless persons defined in the agreements between the EC and 
Albania, Russia and Ukraine shall only become applicable after a certain transition 
period. For Albania and Ukraine, this transition period was agreed to be two years 
after the agreement entered into force; in the case of Russia, this is a three-year 
period. In contrast to the Albanian agreement, which was signed in 2005, the 
agreements for Russia and Ukraine signed in 2007 foresee that during the 
transition period, these obligations shall only be applicable to stateless persons and 
nationals from third-countries with which bilateral arrangements on readmission 
exist. 
On the one hand these differences relate to the different geographic conditions, 
political situations and histories of the signatory countries. On the other hand, however, 
changes evolved over time when the EC became increasingly experienced in 
negotiating readmission agreements. This can be very well illustrated by means of the 
non-affection clause. Here, pressure from the European Parliament and NGOs resulted 
in modification of the wording over time. In the case of Hong Kong and Macao, the 
clause had the following wording: 
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to rights, obligations and 
responsibilities arising from International Law applicable to the Community, 
the Member States and the Hong Kong SAR (Council of the European 
Union, 2002b, p. 23).  
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After the European Parliament and several human rights organisations had strongly 
criticised this non-affection clause for not explicitly referring to human rights or refugee 
law, the agreement with Sri Lanka included the following wording: 
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of the Community, the Member States and Sri Lanka arising 
from International Law and, in particular, from any applicable International 
Convention or agreement to which they are Parties (Council of the 
European Union, 2003a, p. 24). 
Again, criticism was harsh. In consequence, the wording of the Albanian agreement 
became more precise:  
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of the Community, the Member States and Albania arising 
from International Law and, in particular, from the European Convention of 
4 November 1950 for the Protection of Human Rights, the Convention of 28 
July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the Status of Refugees, 
and international instruments on extradition (Council of the European 
Union, 2005, p. 22).  
The agreement, which was signed next, was that with the Russian Federation. Even 
though it does not call it “non-affection clause” but “relation to other international 
obligations”, the list of legal documents to be considered became even longer: 
1. This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of the Community, the Member States and the Russian 
Federation arising from International Law and, in particular, from: 
(a) the Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on 
the Status of Refugees; 
(b) the European Convention of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of 
Human Rights,  
(c) the Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
(d) international treaties on extradition and transit; 
(e) multilateral international treaties containing rules on the readmission of 
foreign nationals, such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
of 7 December 1944 (Council of the European Union, 2007i, Article 18). 
The agreements with Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia 
additionally refer to the international conventions determining the state responsible for 
examining applications for asylum. Instead, the agreement with Ukraine additionally 
refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966. 
For the first time, the readmission agreement with Russia makes explicitly clear that 
provisions of the EC readmission agreement shall take precedence over provisions of 
any bilateral arrangements on readmission. Since then this clarification has been part 
of all new agreements.  
After being in force, each EC readmission agreement will establish a readmission joint 
committee, which shall consist of representatives of the third country and of the 
Commission acting on behalf of the European Community. The latter shall be assisted 
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by experts from member states. The joint committee will be responsible for the 
implementation of the agreement. Furthermore, The European Commission’s 
Directorate General ‘Justice, Freedom, and Security’ is supported by the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), which coordinates, along with 
others, the operational aspects of removal of irregular third country nationals and thus 
plays a decisive role in the implementation of readmission agreements (for more 
details, see Carrera, 2007; Jorry, 2007). 
4.4 The implications on the readmission side 
Data on return is scarce. On the one hand, only limited reliable EU-wide data exist 
which differentiate between voluntary and forced return; on the other hand, countries of 
origin most often lack information about the numbers of returnees. Only recently, the 
European Commission published a working document on “Preparing the next steps in 
border management in the European Union” containing national statistical data on 
refused entry, apprehension of irregular migrants, and removal.21 The data can only 
serve as a vague indicator because EU member states did not agree upon common 
criteria and definitions, and some of them provided only incomplete information. 
Therefore, we have to assume that actual numbers are higher than indicated here. 
Figure 1. Total Number of Removed Aliens (EU-27) 
246,893
215,161 209,409 201,870
2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2008). 
Unfortunately, the data has not been broken down into rejected asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants. Furthermore, because no information has been given about the 
countries to which removal was implemented, we have to consider that out of the total, 
an indeterminate number of individuals were simply being re-cycled within the EU, 
which means they were returned to another EU country from which they had arrived. 
The total numbers of removed aliens were distributed among member states as 
follows: 
 
 
 
                                                     
21 Commission of the European Communities (2008). For older data on the EU15, see also Commission of 
the European Communities (2002b and 2002a). 
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Table 5. Total Number of Removed Aliens (2003-2006) 
2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria 11,070 9,408 5,239 4,904
Belgium 9,996 9,647 10,302 9,264
Bulgaria 814 1,271 1,608 1,501
Cyprus 3,307 2,982 3,015 3,222
Czech Republic 2,602 2,649 2,730 1,228
Denmark 3,100 3,093 2,225 1,986
Germany 30,176 26,807 19,988 15,407
Estonia 171 101 60 91
Finland 2,773 2,775 1,900 1,410
France 11,692 15,672 18,120 21,271
Greece 40,930 35,942 51,079 54,756
Hungary 4,804 3,980 4,348 3,057
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 31,013 27,402 24,001 16,597
Latvia 375 234 162 141
Lithuania 846 306 182 168
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malta 847 680 962 781
Netherlands 23,206 17,775 12,386 12,669
Poland 5,879 6,042 5,141 9,272
Portugal 2,798 3,507 6,162 1,079
Romania 500 650 616 680
Slovenia 3,209 2,632 3,133 3,173
Slovakia 1,293 2,528 2,569 2,185
Spain 26,757 27,364 25,359 33,235
Sweden 7,355 11,714 8,122 3,793
United Kingdom 21,380 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 246,893 215,161 209,409 201,870  
Source: Commission of the European Communities 2008. 
Because data is scarce and EU member states do not provide any data or estimations 
for the future, the transit countries with which the EU signed or seeks to sign 
Community readmission agreements face great difficulties assessing the numbers of 
returnees – both their own nationals as well as third country nationals – they have to 
expect from EU member states after the Community readmission agreement takes 
effect. This uncertainty creates severe difficulties because authorities are in the dark 
regarding personnel and administrative capacities required; the extent of reintegration 
programmes, assistance and job training required; and the scope of detention facilities 
needed. In addition, it is rather difficult to prioritise with which countries of origin they 
should begin to negotiate bilateral readmission agreements because they lack 
experience to help them anticipate which third-country nationals EU member states will 
readmit to the transit countries.  
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The problems transit countries face on the basis of readmission agreements with the 
EU relate to three different groups of people: a. their own state nationals; b. third 
country nationals; c. asylum seekers. 
Own State Nationals 
As agreed in international customary law, each state is obliged to take back its own 
nationals. However, since most often the number of nationals from EU neighbouring 
countries who migrated irregularly to the EU is substantially high, their return creates 
major difficulties for the home country. First of all, remittances often play a major role in 
the transit country’s economy meaning that many families simply depend upon money 
transfer from relatives who work abroad irregularly. Return may very well result in the 
destruction of their economic basis and their deterioration into poverty. Secondly, 
irregular migrants most often stem from remote or rural areas, but when being 
returned, these migrants prefer to stay in or around the capital or major cities. As a 
consequence, their families may leave their villages to join their relatives so that 
authorities have to deal with internal migration and rapid urbanisation. Another 
important implication of return is re-emigration. At least in the case of forced return, 
many migrants look for possibilities to go abroad again because they lack an 
acceptable prospect in their home country. In all these dimensions, even the return of 
its own nationals is a rather complex issue that brings about a lot of challenges for 
transit countries. 
Third Country Nationals 
Even more challenging is the return of third country nationals to transit countries. 
Almost none of the transit countries around the EU has any experience in readmitting 
third country nationals to their home countries, and in most cases, readmission 
agreements with countries of origin are lacking. Because neither the governments of 
the transit countries nor relevant international organisations nor the EU itself are in a 
position to reliably predict the potential level of third country nationals that will be 
returned by EU member states, measures providing for the implementation of third 
country national readmission are subject to uncertainty. The institutional infrastructure 
of government authorities is insufficiently developed, and the personnel lack 
experience in carrying out the various steps of the return procedure. Proper 
communication among various organisational units is not provided for, the technical 
equipment is insufficient, and the staff is untrained regarding human rights aspects of 
the situation and respect for migrants and their needs. Facilities for adequate lodging 
and accommodation are non-existent, and the return of migrants to their home 
countries is nearly impossible given all the administrative, organisational, and financial 
implications of readmission. Therefore, transit countries are in the risk of being left with 
substantial numbers of aliens posing a social and economic burden and turning these 
countries into countries of destination in the end. 
Asylum Seekers 
Readmission agreements not only provide for the return of irregular migrants but also 
for that of rejected asylum-seekers. Sending an asylum-seeker to another state where 
no persecution is feared is not explicitly forbidden by international law – and that is 
exactly what readmission agreements are about. According to the Geneva Refugee 
Convention and its principle of non-refoulement, receiving states are obliged to 
examine the claim before returning the applicant to a third country, to verify that the 
individual applicant will really be safe. However, cases of expulsion without prior 
 38
F. Trauner, I. Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements ..... 
examination of the claim are common, and in many cases return procedures are rather 
informal and the returning state merely informs the receiving country of the planned 
return (Landgren, 1999, p. 26). The majority of bilateral readmission agreements 
between EU member states and third countries do not contain any explicit reference to 
the principle of non-refoulement.22 Even though the notion of ‘safe third countries’ 
requires that these countries have signed international agreements, most importantly 
the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, their proper implementation is not 
considered. Readmission agreements do not explicitly oblige the ‘safe third country’ to 
assure asylum seekers access to a fair refugee determination procedure in line with 
international standards. In addition, returning states might not even make clear that the 
individual is an asylum seeker who has been refused on formal grounds of the ‘safe 
third country’ rule. Chain deportation might be the consequence (for more details, see 
Kruse, 2006). 
The moment the readmission of third country nationals from the EU to neighbouring 
transit countries begins, their asylum system, which most often is young and very weak 
might be put at risk. If EU member states make quite extensive use of the possibility of 
readmitting third country nationals to neighbouring transit countries, and if substantial 
numbers of these apply for asylum in these countries, the systems might soon be over-
loaded. Governments in transit countries already have severe difficulties adhering to 
time limits, providing interpreter services communicating promptly with applicants, and 
running shelters for asylum seekers. These difficulties will get even worse when the 
number of applications rises. Furthermore, sustainable local integration of refugees is 
very difficult, especially because of the often disastrous economic situation in the 
transit countries. Moreover, not only rejected asylum seekers but also irregular 
migrants can apply for asylum upon return, and it can be assumed that substantial 
numbers of irregular migrants might have a severe claim for protection. 
If one assumes that most of the transit countries are not ‘safe third countries’ of asylum 
according to UNHCR criteria we can conclude that the return of rejected asylum 
seekers might imply a lowering of asylum standards below internationally accepted 
standards. The rights of asylum seekers – to have a minimum quality of living 
conditions during the procedure, to obtain necessary information, to have a transparent 
and fair procedure and to have access to an independent appeal process – might be 
violated on the part of EU member states. 
In sum, readmission agreements as such mainly bring about negative consequences 
and difficult challenges of varying dimensions for countries of origin or transit 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002b, p. 26). The negative effects for 
transit countries very much outweigh those of sending countries because transit 
countries have to deal with the onward repatriation of third country nationals. 
We have seen that it is unclear how many irregular migrants and rejected asylum 
seekers EU member states intend to readmit. In addition, it is still an open question 
how many they really can readmit in the end, for two reasons. First, if the limited 
capacities of transit countries are exhausted, it might no longer be in the interests of 
the EU to continue readmitting people because the Union has a basic interest in 
economic, social, and political stability in neighbouring regions. Second, it is difficult to 
assess in how many cases member states’ authorities have the ability to 
unambiguously identify the individual’s nationality or to provide sufficient proof of 
                                                     
22 UNHCR (2001); Rogers & Peers (2005). 
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migration routes. This is a very difficult undertaking, and very often readmission fails 
because of insufficient proofs. Thus, even if Community readmission agreements will 
be implemented in an exemplary way, an important question – probably also a 
quantitative one – remains for EU member states: how to deal with irregular migrants 
whose nationality or migration routes cannot be identified with sufficient certainty?  
The question remains whether readmission agreements are at all an effective tool for 
managing migration flows, however, also in cases where a sufficiently certain testing of 
nationality of irregular migrants could be found. If readmitted migrants do receive no 
support to reintegrate themselves in their home countries or, even worse, run ashore in 
a foreign transit country, there is nothing that prevents them from trying to enter a 
European Union member state again. Similarly, it seems to be questionable at least 
that readmission agreements function as a deterrent and will substantially decrease the 
flow of irregular migrants to the EU as long as the reasons that make people leave their 
country and migrate towards the EU persist.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to assess EC visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements in terms of objectives, substance and implications.  
The analysis has considered the instrument of EC visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements as a major means to implement a new EU security approach in the 
neighbourhood. The EU deemed it necessary to balance two conflicting needs: 
distancing itself from an outside perceived as insecure and strongly controlling its 
external border lines versus establishing closer relationships with the neighbouring 
non-EU countries in order to stabilise its surrounding world. It is this predicament that 
made the EU develop a new security approach understood as the explicit attempt to 
balance between internal security concerns and external stabilisation needs. EC visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements were a chief means in doing so since they 
were regarded as beneficial to both sides. The EU was given a strong lever to make 
third countries sign readmission agreements and pressure for domestic reforms in 
justice and home affairs, whereas in the target countries a major cause of discontent 
was softened by relaxing the tight visa regime and allowing facilitated travel 
opportunities for bona fide travellers. Moreover, governments of third countries got the 
opportunity to present themselves domestically as successful negotiators on the 
international level. The link between visa facilitation and readmission was made for the 
first time with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. When their negotiations on an 
EC readmission agreement did not advance, the EU linked the negotiations to the 
incentive of visa facilitation. In the Western Balkans, visa facilitation and readmission 
were commonly negotiated right from the start (with the exception of Albania). This 
regional setting in South-Eastern Europe provided the EU with a model to be used from 
now on in several neighbouring states. EC visa liberalisation and readmission 
agreements may become a standard foreign policy instrument in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.  
In a next step, the analysis has systematically assessed the EC visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements in terms of content and implications. In terms of substance, 
the EC visa facilitation agreements with the Western Balkans are the most 
comprehensive ones. They contain the clearest statement for visa-free travel and more 
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categories of citizens that benefit from facilitated travel, including tourists in particular. 
The agreements with Ukraine and Moldova are in the middle and the EC-Russian visa 
facilitation agreement at the other end of the scale. The major benefits of the visa 
facilitation agreements are to arrange more relaxed travel opportunities for certain 
categories of the population, to fix the price for all citizens at €35, to ensure more 
transparent and quicker visa application procedures, to govern the establishment of 
local border traffic regimes and to give the perspective of free visa travel in case of a 
smooth implementation of the agreement. The main disadvantage is that it separates 
the population of the target country into two groups – those entitled to the privileges 
and those who are not. Moreover, the Schengen Eastern Enlargement somehow 
undermines the positive achievements by making the Central and Eastern European 
countries strengthen their entry conditions and stop their practice of issuing visas free 
of charge or for a low fee and on relatively uncomplicated terms. The EC visa 
facilitation agreements fall short of sufficiently compensating for these changed 
circumstances. In the context of readmission agreements, the most difficult issue to 
agree upon is the return of third country nationals and stateless persons. In this regard, 
three countries have reached concessions in terms of time. While Albania and Ukraine 
negotiated for a two-year transitional period before the obligations concerning the 
readmission of third-country nationals and stateless persons shall become applicable, 
Russia attained a three-year delay. Another important difference between agreements 
is whether they introduce an accelerated procedure for persons that have been 
apprehended in the border regions. The main advantage of readmission agreements 
from the EC’s points of views is that the Community gets hold of a legal instrument in 
order to force transit countries to readmit not only their own but also third country 
nationals. However, from the point of view of non-EC countries, EC readmission 
agreements as such only bring about negative consequences, which in the end might 
put their economic, social and political stability at risk.  
 
6. Recommendations 
 
Based on the conclusions, the following policy-related recommendations can be given.  
• EU member states should take the considerations of neighbouring states seriously 
and use the visa facilitation agreements to implement a more user-friendly policy. 
Issuing a visa should be done in a transparent and comprehensible procedure and 
not be seen as a privilege. 
• The implementation of the EC visa facilitation agreements should be based on the 
premise that a modification of the EU’s negative visa list is realistic and feasible on 
condition that the cooperation functions effectively. Road Maps, similar to the ones 
the Western Balkans are given, should be drafted for all target third-countries to 
clarify the specific conditions and criteria needed for the objective of visa-free 
travel.  
• The stipulations foreseen to soften the negative side-effects of the Schengen 
Eastern Enlargement should be smoothly implemented (e.g. the Polish-Ukrainian 
negotiations on a local border traffic regime were still ongoing at the time of 
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writing).23 Other measures in this respect e.g. a lower fee for the issuance of visas 
should be subject to discussions in the joint committees implementing the EC visa 
facilitation agreements.  
• With regard to readmission, the EC should carefully balance costs and benefits for 
both sides. The EC’s responsibility does not end the moment the persons are 
readmitted. Returning substantial numbers of irregular migrants to neighbouring 
countries that are overburdened financially, administratively and socially by the 
challenge of either reintegrating their own nationals or – even more difficult – further 
readmitting third-country nationals to their countries of origin might put their often 
weak economic, political and social stability at risk.  
• Thus, the EC should take a step further and think about supporting its neighbours in 
the process of implementation of visa and readmission agreements. Otherwise, the 
dominant focus on strong and effective control of frontiers might put the stability of 
neighbourhood regions at risk again. 
                                                     
23 Authors’ interview with Ukrainian specialist on visa policy, 25 January 2008. 
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